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Legal Presumptions and the Role of Mental Health
Professionals in Child Custody Proceedings
Janet M. Bowermaster*
Changes in child custody law are shifting the framework in
which mental health professionals participate in child custody
proceedings. The reintroduction of legal presumptions, combined
with the ubiquitous delegation of custody decision-making authority
to mental health professionals has created problems that threaten
the integrity of the family courts.
Widespread involvement of psychologists, social workers,
therapists, and psychiatrists in child custody determinations was
ushered in by the abandonment of determinate rules of decision in
the 1970's. During this period, most states moved away from the
"tender years" presumption and fault-based rules towards a broad
and formless "best interests of the child" standard.
Because the best interests standard is not susceptible to
traditional legal analysis, judges turned to mental health
professionals for expertise regarding children and child
development. Over time, the judiciary came to rely heavily on
mental health professionals in child custody decision-making. So
long as trial judges had unfettered discretion in making custody
awards, mental health professionals enjoyed similar leeway in
making custody recommendations to the court.
Legal presumptions are being reintroduced into American child
custody law.1 These new presumptions narrow the broad grant of
judicial discretion under the best interests standard by providing
subsidiary rules of decision for certain types of cases with
recurring fact patterns. Because judges are bound by the legal
constraints of these presumptions, recommendations made to
judges by mental health professionals are similarly constrained.
Recognizing the symbiotic relationship between mental health
recommendations and judicial decisions, appellate courts have
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author wishes to thank her
husband John K Davis for his inspiration and support; Professors Barbara Cox and Josie
Gittler for their review and editorial suggestions; and Christine Denton, Todd Sulger, Jeanine
Robinson and Amy Pincolini for their valuable research assistance.
1. Indeed, the trend in family law in the last thirty years has been away from broad
judicial discretion and toward more certain rules of decision. This trend has been most
evident in the area of child support, and has made the least progress in child custody. THE
AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS, Chief Reporter's Preface xiii
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begun to scrutinize the legal correctness of the mental health
recommendations in child custody cases. This scrutiny raises new
issues for child custody practice. This article is divided into five
sections. Section I gives a brief history of the best interest of the
child standard, tracing the abandonment of the old paternal,
maternal, and fault-based presumptions, which previously guided
the application of the best interests standard, and looking briefly at
the formless, unworkable standard that remains.
Section II describes how implementing the formless best
interests standard led to the pervasive involvement of mental health
professionals in child custody proceedings. It catalogs the wide
range of roles that mental health professionals currently play in
child custody cases, especially those roles in which they make
custody recommendations to the court.
Section III provides the background for understanding the
modern presumptions being re-introduced into child custody
proceedings to guide the application of the best interests standard.
The structure and procedural function of devices ranging from
simple inferences to conclusive presumptions are detailed. This
section also discusses how the new presumptions constrain judicial
decision-making, and thus necessarily constrain the custody
recommendations made by mental health professionals.
Section IV uses paternity and move-away cases from California
and domestic violence cases from North Dakota to illustrate the
types of problems the new presumptions have created relating to
the involvement of mental health professionals in making custody
recommendations. These problems include the courts'
unwillingness to assume a legal role, the ignorance of relevant
presumptions, the inability to apply presumptions because of
insufficient legal knowledge, and resistance to the substantive
content of the presumption because of conflicting professional
values. Section V questions whether psychologists, mediators, and
social workers should make recommendations on the ultimate issue
of custody. It inquires about the scientific basis for custody
recommendations, the degree to which value judgements are
involved, and the reasons mental health professionals are being
asked to make legal determinations in child custody proceedings.
Finally, section VI concludes by briefly exploring alternatives for
accommodating the legal and practical aspects of the role mental
health professionals are currently asked to play in disputed custody
cases.
I.

CHILD CUSTODY LAW ABANDONS RULES OF DECISION

Until the 1970's, there were clear decisional rules for deciding
child custody cases. Early American common law gave fathers the
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legal right to custody and control of their legitimate children.2 This
paternal entitlement was a status-based property right - children,
in essence, were "owned" by their fathers.3 Some exceptions
existed to this rule of paternal possession, but only in
extraordinary cases. 4 Judicial decision-making under this rule was
straightforward. If the man in question was determined to be the
father, the only issue subject to judicial discretion was whether he
was so 5unfit that a rare deviation from paternal custody was
required.
The paternal entitlement rule during the nineteenth century
yielded to the "best interests of the child" standard as the
governing substantive principle in custody adjudications. 6 However,
the indeterminacy of this evolved standard led courts to develop
secondary criteria for determining what was in children's best
interests. 7 Some courts developed a legal presumption that the
interests of children, especially young. children or children of
"tender years," were best served by placement in their mothers'
custody.8 This "maternal" or "tender years" presumption, like the
traditional paternal custody rule, was status-based. 9 However,
unlike the traditional paternal preference, which embodied notions
of property rights in the child, the maternal preference derived
from assumptions about the nurturing quality of mother-child
relationships. 10
Concurrently, other courts retained a paternal preference, but
with a new rationale that focused on the protective quality of
father-child relationships, rather than on incidents of ownership in
the child." A showing that the presumed custodian was unfit could
rebut both the paternal and maternal presumptions. 2 By the end of
or tender years
the nineteenth century, the maternal preference
3
doctrine predominated American case law.'
Fault was another subsidiary rule of decision that coexisted with
the tender years doctrine. Prior to the no-fault revolution of the
1970's, fault principles governed the availability of divorce, with
2. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM 82 (1991); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
xiii (1994); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary
Caretakeras Custodian, 63 N. DAi L REV. 481, 486 (1987).
3. FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 82.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; O'Kelly, supra note 2, at 488.
7. FREmAN, supra note 2, at 82.
8. Id. at 82-83.
9. O'Kelly, supra note 2, at 487.
10. Id. at 487-88.
11. Id. at 488.
12. Id. at 489.

13. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 128 (1988).
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custody typically being awarded to the innocent spouse. 14 These
fault principles also interacted with the tender years or maternal
presumption. For example, under the maternal presumption, a
finding of maternal unfitness could defeat custody. The most
common basis for finding maternal unfitness was immorality; 5
adultery was considered to be immoral. Thus, an adulterous mother
could lose custody of her children under the tender years doctrine
because she was morally unfit, and because she was not the
innocent party under the fault rule.
The divorce revolution of the 1970's, with its focus on gender
neutrality and changing marital roles, saw the demise of both the
tender years presumption and fault-based divorce. 16 This left most
jurisdictions with the vague best interest standard stripped of the
definitive subsidiary rules that had previously guided its
application. "
Custody determinations under the best interests standard
significantly differ from the standard model of adjudication. Unlike
the typical adjudicatory process, which focuses on fact-finding, past
actions, and application of rules, the resolution of child custody
disputes under the best interests standard calls for an assessment
of the parties' personal characteristics, and predictions as to which
parent will better meet the child's future needs.18 So long as the
subsidiary presumptions made the "outcome turn in a systematic
way on the showing of ascertainable facts about the past," the
judicial function in custody cases resembled the fact-finding and
rule application role familiar to lawyers and judges. 19 However, the
judicial role took on new and unfamiliar aspects when these
subsidiary rules were abandoned.
Decision-making under the broad, undifferentiated best interest
standard requires a wide-ranging comparative evaluation of two fit
parents, with no substantive standard against which to judge
competing values. 20 The judge decides which of the myriad of
possible factors affecting a child's "best interests" are relevant in
each custody case. While many states provide statutory lists of
factors for judges to consider in determining a child's best
interests, these lists are ineffective as substantive guides for
14.

FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 83-84. Typical fault grounds included adultery, desertion,

and cruelty. JOHN DE Wrrr GREGORY ET AL, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAw 209-13 (1993).

15. O'Kelly, supra note 2, at 496 n.78.
16. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CoNTroP. PROBS. 226, 235 (1975); JACOB, supra note 13, at 80;
Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32 FAm.L Q. 201,
203 (1998).
17. O'Kelly, supra note 2, at 498.
18. Mnooldn, supra note 16, at 249-52.
19. Id. at 252.
20. O'Kelly, supra note 2, at 500.
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custody decision-making. 21
First, the statutory lists are not definitive. Courts are typically
directed to consider the statutorily enumerated factors "among any
other factors the court finds relevant." 22 Thus, significant discretion
is left to the courts to determine the other aspects of a custody
situation to be considered. With so little guidance, judges often rely
on personal values to determine what individual qualities, parenting
skills, or situational factors are important in their decisions. As a
result, familiarity with local judges' personal predilections and
preferences in family law cases may be as important as knowledge
of the relevant law.
Second, the statutory factors do not embody the standards for
decision. For example, California courts are directed to consider
"the nature and amount of contact with both parents."23 However,
there is no indication of how much contact is too little, too much,
or the appropriate amount. There is not even a clear indication of
whether contact includes only in-person contact or whether phone
calls, letters, and e-mail communications are included. Therefore,
the factors' substantive content can only be derived from outside
from the personal values and opinions of the
the statute - again
24
decision-maker.
Finally, the enumerated factors are typically presented without
suggestion of relative importance. Absent the legislature weighting
or rank-ordering the factors, widely divergent decisions can be
different
supported on the same facts by simply emphasizing
25
factors from the many available for consideration.
II.

MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ARE SOUGHT TO FILL THE VOID OF
THE "BEST INTERESTS" STANDARD

Discomfort with the virtually formless best interests analysis has
21. The Model Marriage and Divorce Act provides thatThe court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.
The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.
M.M.D.A. § 402 (1970).
22. See, e.g., the California Family Code, which provides that: "In making a
determination of the best interest of the child in a proceeding described in Section 3021, the
court shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following.. . ." CAL
FAi. CODE § 3011(West 2000).
23.

CAL FAm. CODE § 3011(c) (West 2000).

24. Dorinda N. Noble, Custody Contest: How to Divide and Reassemble a Child, 64
Soc. CASEWORK 406, 407 (1983).
25. O'Keliy, supra note 2, at 500.
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led courts to involve mental health professionals in giving
substantive content to child custody decision-making. 26 The mental
health professions seemed an appropriate source for this content
because they typically confront issues such as parenting skills,
psychological
attachment,
sibling
relationships,
and
the
developmental needs of the child. Over time, the involvement of
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers in child custody
proceedings has increased dramatically.27 Today, mental health
professionals are heavily involved in child custody proceedings in a
variety of roles.
A.

Expert Witnesses

Mental health professionals sometimes serve as expert witnesses
to educate the court on issues such as the effects of divorce,
general psychological principles, or child development. This type of
expert testimony does not depend on the interpretation of
information gathered for the particular case under consideration,
but rather on the expert's general knowledge of these areas. 28
B.

Therapists

Some mental health professionals provide supportive therapy to
individuals and families involved in family court proceedings.
Individual therapists counsel parents or children on a one-to-one
basis during the difficult period surrounding a divorce. Family
therapists see the family as a group, with the goal of improving
family system functioning. When therapists gather information from
clients about family and friends, it is understood that client reports
are a reflection of the clients' perceptions and are not necessarily
true. However, because the therapy focuses on the clients' inner
thoughts and feelings, in this
context, perceptions are more
29
important than objective truth.
C. Psychological Evaluators
Some mental health professionals assess individuals' cognitive,
and/or emotional, functioning for the purpose of planning
appropriate therapeutic interventions. For example, psychological
evaluations may be performed when a child is having problems at
school, when an adolescent is abusing drugs, or when an adult has
been hospitalized for acute depression. Such psychological
26. David N. Bolocofsky, Use and Abuse of Mental Health Experts in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 BEHAv. SCd & L. 197, 198 (1989); Deborah Karras & Kenneth K. Berry,
Custody Evaluations: A Critical Review, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL RES. & PRAC. 76, 76 (1985).
27.

PHILIP MICHAEL STAHL, CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS. A COMPREHENSIVE

GUIDE 4 (1994).
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 14.
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evaluation focuses on the individual and is not an assessment of
family functioning. 3°
D. Custody Evaluators
Mental health professionals who conduct custody evaluations are
charged with assessing family dynamics, including the strengths
and weaknesses of each parent, and the functioning of the children.
These evaluators compile data from many different sources
including observations of, and interviews with, parents and
children; interviews and archival information from third-party
sources; and administration of psychological tests.3 1 In contrast to
the therapeutic context, this forensic context requires that the
litigants' perspectives and facts be independently confirmed. Thus,
evaluators may seek information from day care providers, teachers,
pediatricians, coaches, social service agencies, therapists, and the
like to confirm
the objective truth of the subject's reported
32
perceptions.
Some custody evaluators limit their involvement to providing the
court with detailed assessments of family functioning, while others
go further and make recommendations on the ultimate legal issue
of which parent would be the better custodian.3 Conducting child
custody evaluations is fast becoming an area of professional
specialization for clinical and forensic psychologists.34
E.

Mediators

Some jurisdictions require the mandatory mediation of child
custody cases so that the parties must attempt to resolve their
custody disputes before a judge can hear their case.3 5 Mental health
professionals serving as mediators in these custody proceedings
may play a facilitative or a decision-making role.
The traditional goal of custody mediation was to facilitate the
30.
31.

Id. at 15.
GARY B. MELTON ET AL, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR

MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAwYERS 501 (2d ed. 1997).

32. JONATHAN
19 (1998).

W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS

33. There continues to be professional dispute as to whether psychologists should
make recommendations on the ultimate question of custody. See American Psychological
Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings,29 FAm. L Q.
51, 58 (1995). (hereinafter APA Guidelines]
34. Marion Gindes, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations for Psychologists: An
Overview and Commentary, 29 FAm. L Q. 39 (1995).
35. See, e.g., CAL FAM. CODE § 3170(a) (West 2000) (stating that "[i]f it appears on the
face of a petition, application, or other pleading to obtain or modify a temporary or
permanent custody or visitation order that custody, visitation, or both are contested, the
court shall set the contested issues for mediation").
For a complete listing of other jurisdictions which impose or allow mandatory mediation,
see Christy L Hendrix, Note, The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview, 32 J. FAM. L. 491 (1993-94).
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conflict resolution process so that parents could create their own
custody agreements. 36 Mediators who see couples as part of their
private practice, as well as those in some court-annexed programs,
still function in this traditional facilitative mode. However, in some
California counties, however, mediators in court-annexed Family
Court Services ("FCS") play a decision-making role in child custody
proceedings. When FCS mediations in these counties do not
produce voluntary custody agreements between the parents, the
FCS mediator "changes hats" and uses the information learned
during the mediation sessions to make a custody recommendation
to the court.37 Because the courts so often follow these
recommendations, FCS mediators in these "recommending"
counties are widely viewed as being the de facto decision makers
in contested custody cases. 38
F

Special Masters

Mental health professionals who take on the role of special
master are given even more explicit decision-making power in
custody cases. Special masters are most often appointed after
custody evaluations have been conducted, to monitor and oversee
the relationship between the parties in an ongoing fashion. 39 In
California, specially defined issues (e.g. problems surrounding
transportation or exchange of children for visitation) can be
referred to and decided by a special master who can be appointed
36. Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology and Mediation
on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 30 F.m. &
CONCILIATION Cis. REv. 112, 122 (1992).
37. CAL FAM. CODE § 3183 (a) (West 2000) (providing that "[tlhe mediator may,
consistent with local court rules, submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of
or visitation with the child").
38. Investigation and analysis of court files and records in 282 disputed child-custody
cases in San Diego, California revealed a 75% agreement between the FCS mediator's
recommendation and the judge's decision. Carla C. Kunin et al., An Archival Study of
Decision-Making in Child Custody Disputes, 48 J. CLINIcA PSYCHOL 564, 570-71 (1992). The
data was interpreted as substantiating claims that the mediators were emerging as the true
decision-makers in disputed custody cases. Id. The influence of FCS recommendations has
become so well recognized in San Diego that "mediation preparation" has emerged as a new
professional service. Mediators or lawyers familiar with FCS processes charge from $100 to
$150 per hour to coach parents in disputed custody cases on how to best present themselves
to the FCS mediators. Believing that the real custody decision is made in the FCS mediation
session, parents pay for professional preparation in order to maximize their chances of
getting a favorable recommendation and thus a favorable custody decision. Interviews with
Lawyers and Mediators in San Diego, Cal. See also, 5 BAR REPORT: NEWS AND EVENTS OF THE
SAN DiEGo COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 6 (1999) (classified advertisement for this service by
former Family Court Services mediator); 1999 National CLE Conference: Family Law,
Winning the Psychological War: Preparing the Client for the Mediation and Custody
Evaluation Process, in Vail, Colorado (Jan. 3, 1999).
39. Though referred to by other names such as mediator or arbitrator in other
jurisdictions, their functions are largely the same despite the difference in names. STAHL,
supra note 28, at 18.
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without the consent of the parties.40 After hearing all sides of the
issue, the special master makes advisory findings. Much like the
FCS recommendations, the findings of special masters do not
adopted by the court. They are, however,
become binding unless
41
given great weight.
The range of referable issues is much broader when the parties
affirmatively consent to appointment of a special master. When
parties consent, a master may make conclusive determinations on
any and all issues regarding custody without further action by the
court. 42 The parties' consent prevents this broad delegation of
judicial authority from being unlawful. 3
G. Recommendations
With the overwhelming caseloads in family courts,4 many judges
have come to rely on the fact-finding and custody
recommendations of mental health professionals in child custody
proceedings. 45 The indeterminacy of the best interests standard
made this reliance possible by conferring a scope of judicial
discretion in custody matters that is unprecedented in any other
area of the law.46 So long as judges have unfettered discretion, the
recommendations of custody evaluators, FCS mediators, and
special masters cannot be incorrect in any substantive sense.
Reliance on the recommendations simply substitutes the personal
for the
values and judgments of the mental health professional
47
personal values and judgments of the family court judge.

II.

THE REINTRODUCTION OF SUBSIDIARY PRESUMPTIONS

Judicial discretion to determine the best interests of the child
has been narrowed in recent years through the emergence of
modem legal presumptions. These presumptions are not like the
40. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 639 (Deering 1998).
41. In re Rosoto, 519 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Cal. 1974).
42. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §638 (Deering 1998).
43. In re Marriage of Olson, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 485-86 (Cal. App. 1993).
44. Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation:The Promise of a System of
Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L Q. 3, 6 (1998).
45. Gender Issues in the California Courts: Focus on Family Law, 30 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 50, 59 (1992) (suggesting that mandatory mediation of custody
disputes relieves overburdened family law calendars).
One how-to book on child custody evaluations advises would-be-evaluators that "many
judges never look at the report itself. They care only about the bottom line of how custody
is to be divided or shared." STAHL, supra note 28, at 136.
This "bottom line" use of custody recommendations has sometimes led to challenges of
improper delegation of judicial authority. See JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE

§ 12.15 at 687 (Supp. 1995); Jones v. Jones, 931 S.W.2d 767, 772-73 (Ark. 1996); Shapiro v.
Shapiro, 458 A.2d 1257 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
46. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in ContemporaryFamily Law and
Succession Law, 60 TuL L REv. 1165, 1167 (1986).
47. MELTON, supra note 31, at 488.
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single-principle paternal or maternal preferences that once
governed all custody cases.18 Rather, they apply to certain
categories of cases with regularly occurring fact patterns that have
been removed from the unguided discretion of the best interests
standard and marked for special treatment.
Within these categories, the courts or legislatures have agreed on
what constitutes the best interests of the child, and have declared
clear and consistent principles to guide adjudication. The
appropriate balance of certainty, through fixed rules that produce
similar outcomes in similar cases, and flexibility, through discretion
to tailor outcomes to the idiosyncrasies of each case, is achieved
through the procedural effects embedded within the particular
presumption employed.
Significant confusion exists about presumptions and their effects.
Much of this confusion stems from the use of the term
"presumption" to cover several distinct procedural devices. 49 A
presumption is a legal fiction that allows the trier of fact to
establish the existence of a presumed fact, for which there may be
no direct evidence, based upon proof of other basic facts. 50 For
example, upon showing that one parent has committed acts of
domestic violence against the other, the court may presume that
custody with the abusive parent is not in the best interests of the
child. 51 The various procedural devices that are typically lumped
together within the rubric of presumptions may be viewed as a
continuum along which the strength of procedural advantage
conferred on the beneficiary of the presumption is measured. 52 This
continuum runs from simple permissible inferences at the weak
end, through rebuttable presumptions, to conclusive presumptions
at the strong end.
A.

PermissibleInference

At the weak end of the continuum is the permissible inference.
An inference is a logical conclusion that the trier of fact is
permitted, but not required, to make based on proof of certain
basic facts.5 Because fact finders may or may not draw the
inference, inferences have no necessary legal effect. For example,
when a party fails to call a witness whose testimony could be
material to an issue in the case, the trier of fact is traditionally
48.
49.
This, 25
50.

See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text.
G. Michael Fenner, Presumptions: 350 Years of Confusion and It Has Come to
CREIGHTON L REV. 383, 396 (1992).

Joel S. Hjelmaas, Stepping Back From the Thicket: A Proposalfor the Treatment of

Rebuttable Presumptionsand Inferences, 42 DRAKE L REV. 427, 430-31 (1993).
51. See, e.g., CAL FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2000).
52.
RICHARD 0. LEMPEIR & STEPHEN A. SALTzBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS, AND CASES 803 (2d ed. 1982).

53.

Hjelmaas, supra note 50, at 431.
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allowed to draw the inference that the testimony would have been
unfavorable to that party.54
B. Rebuttable Presumption
Rebuttable presumptions are next in strength along the
continuum. Rebuttable presumptions may affect all or part of the
burden of proof.55 Those rebuttable presumptions that shift only the
burden of production are stronger than permissible inferences, but
weaker than rebuttable presumptions that shift the entire burden of
proof. When the presumption only shifts the burden of production,
a party who proves the basic fact is entitled to have the resulting
presumed fact accepted as proven, unless the opposing party
introduces some evidence to disprove the presumed fact. 56 Thus,
the presumption shifts to the opposing party the burden of
producing some substantial evidence to contradict the presumed
the presumption
fact.57 Once contradictory evidence is introduced,
5
disappears and the facts are weighed as usual. s
Rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of proof are
stronger in their procedural effect than those that shift only the
burden of production. Presumptions that shift the burden of proof
are treated the same as presumptions that shift only the production
burden, until the opposing party introduces evidence disputing the
presumed fact. Once such evidence is introduced, presumptions
affecting the burden of proof continue to affect the burden of
persuasion so that "jurors will be instructed that they must find the
presumed fact unless the party opposing the presumption
convinces them by some appropriate standard that the presumed
fact does not exist."59
Additional procedural effect is achieved by elevating the standard
54. Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 AIz. L REv. 27 (1984).
55. The burden of proof is composed of two aspects - the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion. Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and Transcendentalism: You
Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 H.- v. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 691, 691 (1994). The burden of production
refers to the requirement that a party raise an issue and be able to produce some evidence
to support it. The burden of persuasion has two components that come into play after a
particular issue has been raised - the risk of non-persuasion and the standard of proof. Id.
The risk of non-persuasion is the risk that the party who bears the burden of persuasion may
not be able to meet the standard of proof on an issue and thus have it decided against him
or her. Id. at 692.
The standard of proof refers to the level at which the litigant's proof must convince the
trier of fact. The typical standard of proof in civil cases is "by the preponderance of the
evidence." "By clear and convincing evidence" represents an elevated standard in civil cases.
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" is the standard employed in criminal proceedings.
56. LEmPirT & SALrXBURG, supra note 52, at 804.
57. D. Craig Lewis, Should the Bubble Always Burst?: The Need for a Different
Treatment of Presumptions Under IRE 301, 32 IDAuo L REv. 5, 6 (1995).
58. Id.
59. LEmPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 52, at 804.
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of proof to rebut the presumption. 60 In child custody proceedings,
this elevation would typically be from "preponderance of the
evidence" standard to the "clear and convincing" standard.
C. Conclusive Presumptions
At the strongest end of the procedural effect continuum are
conclusive presumptions for which the legal effect of proving the
basic fact is the same as proving the presumed fact.6 ' These
presumptions are conclusive because rebuttal evidence is not
allowed. 62 The term "presumption" for this procedural device is a
misnomer because an irrebuttable presumption has the same effect
as a substantive rule of law.6 Under California law, for example, a
man whose wife gives birth to a child while they are married and
living together is presumed to be the child's father. If this
presumption is not rebutted within two years after the child's birth,
the husband's paternity becomes conclusive and may no longer be
legally challenged. 64
IV.

NARROWED JUDICIAL DISCRETION CREATES PROBLEMS FOR THE

INVOLVEMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
The creation and employment of presumptions under the best
interests standard adds a degree of certainty to child custody
determinations by narrowing the judicial discretion to consider and
weigh factors to determine what is in the child's best interest. To
the extent that calling upon judges to apply definable legal
standards alters the judicial task in child custody proceedings, what
judges need from custody recommendations also changes. If
custody recommendations do not comply with controlling law, they
will not assist judges with their judicial task. However, the need for
mental health professionals to incorporate the effects of legal
presumptions into their evaluation and recommendation process
creates several problems.
A.

Unwilling to Assume Legal Role

Some mental health professionals
incorporate legal considerations into
proceedings. 65 They perceive their role
consider to be in the best interests

believe it inappropriate to
their role in child custody
as recommending what they
of the child, regardless of

60. Fenner, supra note 49, at 10-11.
61. L mPERT & SALrABURG, supra note 52, at 803.
62. Hjelmaas, supra note 50, at 433.
63. Id.; LFPpurr & SALTZBURG, supra note 52, at 803.
64. See CAL FAm. CODE § 7540 (West 2000).
65. This was a common response from audience members when the author presented
this idea in papers at professional conferences or conducted training on presumptions for
mental health professionals.
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whether their recommendations comply with the law. Application
of the law, in their view, is the judge's responsibility. While this
view may be correct from their professional perspective, it creates
significant problems when mental health professionals make
recommendations in child custody proceedings involving legal
presumptions.
Custody recommendations that do not comply with the law are
of diminished usefulness to the courts. Judges are sworn to apply
and uphold the law. When custody recommendations contravene
the law, judges cannot rely on them. Rather, the judges must
re-weigh the available information in light of the controlling law to
make independent custody determinations. For judges who
frequently adopt the recommendations
of mental health
professionals, the need for such re-weighing requires a significant
increase in the amount of judicial time allotted to custody
decision-making.
Even judges who typically make their own custody
determinations may find that the fact-finding and professional
expertise of custody evaluators and mediators is compromised by
their lack of legal focus. This occurs most obviously when the lack
of attention to controlling law results in a failure on the part of the
expert to address the necessary legal issues. When this happens,
further fact-finding is required to provide the court with sufficient
information to make a legally correct custody determination. The
need to re-do the work of the mental health professionals largely
negates the benefits of their efficiency and expertise, which are
thought to derive from their involvement in custody proceedings.
In a recent California case, for example, an FCS custody
recommendation failed to incorporate California's then 3-year-old
move-away presumption.6 The final recommendation did not
comport with controlling law and failed to provide sufficient
information on the relevant legal issues for the court to make an
independent and legally correct custody determination.
The law in California is reasonably clear in this area California's
move-away presumption, recognized by the California Supreme
Court in In re Marriage of Burgess, favors the ability of custodial
parents to relocate without losing custody of their children.67 The
only remedy for non-custodial parents resisting the relocation of
their children is a change of custody.68 Custodial parents
themselves cannot be legally restricted from relocating because of
their constitutional right to travel.69 The Burgess court emphasized
66. In re Marriage of Bower, No. 98615 (San Diego Super. Ct. filed July 1999).
67. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
68. Id. at 482. See also Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 771 (Cal. App. 1997).
69. Arthur B. La France, Child Custody and Relocation: A ConstitutionalPerspective,
34 J. F u. L 1, 67-81 (1995-96).
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that lower courts cannot assume that the custodial parents will not
move if it means losing custody of their children.7 0 Rather, the
move must be assumed to occur, so the pertinent inquiry becomes
whether the child's interests would be best served by being with
the custodial parent7 in the new location or the non-custodial parent
in the old location. 1
As in other change of custody cases, the non-custodial parent has
72
the burden of establishing that a change of custody is warranted.
In California move-away cases, no change in custody is warranted
unless the non-custodial parent can establish that the proposed
move would be so detrimental to the child that it is "essential or
expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a change" of
custody.73 Ordinary incidents of moving, including greater distance
from the non-custodial parent, and changes in homes, schools and
communities, do not satisfy the detriment requirement. 74 The
Burgess Court emphasized that "the interests of a minor child in
the continuity and permanency of custodial placement with the
primary caretaker will most often prevail....
In contravention of this law, the July 1999 Family Court Services
report in In re Bower recommended that the mother not be granted
permission to move to New Jersey with her six-year-old daughter.7 6
The primary reason for this recommendation was that no
acceptable visitation schedule could be arranged with the allegedly
violent 77father if the child was allowed to relocate with her
mother.
The parties in this case had three children, two sons and a much
younger daughter. 78 The mother claimed that the father had been
physically violent during the marriage.79 However, because the boys
had also become physically violent and threatening to the mother,
the parties stipulated in the original custody agreement that the
father would have custody of the boys and the mother would have
70. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481, n 7. See also Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771; In re Marriage
of Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 684 (Cal. App. 1998).
71. Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (1996); Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684. It
should be noted that this is not a crisp dichotomy. Except in the unusual situation where
divorced parents maintained residences very close to one another, a transfer of custody to
the formerly non-custodial parent who remains in the "old location" still involves changing
houses, neighborhoods, schools, access to playmates, etc.
72. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 489 (Cal. 1986).
73. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 482 (quoting In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P. 2d 36, 38 (Cal.
1979)).
74. Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d at 683.
75. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483.
76. Family Court Services Report 6, cited in In re Marriage of Bower, No. 98615 (San
Diego Super. Ct. filed July 19, 1999)[hereinafter FCS Report].
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. at 2, 5.
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custody of the daughter.80 The younger boy's behavioral problems
escalated under his father's custody,
and he was incarcerated for a
81
time in a juvenile detention center.
With regard to possible visitation schedules, the mediator
reasoned that the father could not safely leave this son, who was
only recently released from incarceration and still behaviorally
troubled, to travel to New Jersey to visit with his daughter.82
Further, if the father were to have extended visitation with the
daughter in San Diego, the father would eventually have to go to
work and leave the young daughter unsupervised with the son,
whom the counselor considered to be dangerous to her.8A Thus, the
counselor recommended that the court not grant the mother
permission to move to New Jersey with her daughter.8
The mediator's recommendation was legally and logically flawed,
as well as insufficiently focused on the relevant legal issues to be
addressed. In Burgess, the California Supreme Court made it clear
that the only remedy in a move-away case is a change of custody.85
However, the mediator in Bower recommended refusing the mother
permission to move to New Jersey, without addressing the issue of
changing custody.8 6 The Burgess Court emphasized that "calling the
mother's bluff" was not allowed, and that the legal analysis must
87
assume that the requested move would take place.
Nevertheless, the mediator's recommendations for visitation in
Bower were based on the impermissible assumption that the
mother would remain in San Diego to avoid loss of custody.
Accordingly, the trial court could not legally accept the mediator's
recommendation. Moreover, the court was unable to use the
information contained in the report to craft a legally correct
custody decision. That is, the court could not use the mediator's
determination that no acceptable visitation plan could be arranged
as evidence of the detriment necessary to overcome the Burgess
presumption and switch custody to the father. If the father could
not manage short periods of visitation, how could he be deemed
acceptable for primary custodian of the child?
The mediator failed to consider all reasonable alternatives. It is
true that, if the daughter were to have extended visitation with the
father in San Diego, the father would eventually have to go to work
and leave her without supervision. However, this is a common
80. Id. at 2, 4, 5. Subsequent to that agreement, the older boy turned eighteen and was
no longer subject to the custody order. Id. at 1.
81. FCS Report, supra note 76, at 3.
82. Id. at 6
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
86. FCS Report, supra note 76, at 6.
87. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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occurrence for non-custodial parents who have only one child or
who have multiple children too young to be left alone without
parental supervision. Parents of these children typically provide
appropriate supervision in their absence, either through the use of
babysitters or out-of-home day care. There is no reason why the
father in this case could not hire a competent adult to supervise his
daughter in his absence. If the son's presence created obstacles to
that option, the father could reasonably be expected to arrange for
out-of-home day care for his daughter.
Because the mediator did not concern himself with the legal
issues involved in a move-away case, he failed to address whether
a change of custody to the father would be an appropriate remedy.
On the facts of this particular case, a court might conclude that a
home situation, too dangerous for the daughter's extended
visitation, would not be a viable option as a primary custodial
home. Before maldng such an important determination, however,
the court might wish to obtain more substantial information or an
expert's opinion about the perceived advantages and disadvantages
of each parent's home.8 8
88. Because of the mother's allegations of physical violence during the marriage, the
comparison of the relative fitness of the parents would also have implicated other legal
considerations relating to the legislative reluctance to award sole or joint custody to a
perpetrator of domestic violence.
Effective January 1, 1998, the California Family Code was amended to elevate the
importance of domestic violence concerns in child custody determinations. The following
provisions were added:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the pubic policy of this state to assure
that the health, safety, and welfare of children shall be the court's primary concern in
determining the best interest of children when making any orders regarding the
custody or visitation of children. The Legislature further finds and declares the
perpetration of child abuse or domestic violence in a household where a child resides
is detrimental to the child.
.... (c) Where the policies set forth in subdivision (a) and (b) of this section are in
conflict, any court's order regarding custody or visitation shall be made in a manner
that ensures the health, safety, and welfare of the child and the safety of all family
members.
CAL FAm.CODE § 3020 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
In making a determination of the best interest of the child in a proceeding described in §
3021, the court shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following:
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child. (b) Any history of abuse by one
parent or any other person seeking custody against any of the following:
(1) Any child to whom he or she is related by blood or affinity or with whom he or
she has had a caretaking relationship, no matter how temporary.
(2) The other parent.
(3) A parent, current spouse, or cohabitant, of the parent or person seeking
custody, or a person with whom the parent or person seeking custody has a dating or
engagement relationship. As a prerequisite to the consideration of allegations of
abuse, the court may require substantial independent corroboration including, but not
limited to, written reports by law enforcement agencies ....
.... (e)(l) Where allegations about a parent pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) have
been brought to the attention of the court in the current proceeding, and the court
makes an order for sole or joint custody to that parent, the court shall state its
reasons in writing or on the record. In these circumstances, the court shall ensure
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When mental health professionals are unwilling to be guided by
controlling law, their recommendations on ultimate issues of
custody and visitation are often legally impermissible, and therefore
of little, if any, use to the courts. Even information on subsidiary
issues needed by the courts to make their own custody
determinations often goes undeveloped by mental health
professionals who fail to identify and consider the legally relevant
issues. Clearly, mental health professionals involved in child
custody proceedings cannot continue to simply ignore applicable
legal presumptions.
B.

Ignorance of Presumption

Even among those mental health professionals who view their
role in child custody proceedings as having some legal dimension,
several types of problems have emerged. The most straightforward
problem occurs when mental health professionals are unaware of
the existence of a legal presumption and therefore fail to apply it.89
In re Marriage of Rebecca and David R. is an example of a case
where a conclusive presumption was ignored. 90
Rebecca and David R. were married for 17 years and had two
children. 9' David was listed as the father on each child's birth
certificate. 92 A dissolution petition was filed in 1992, 93 and during
the dissolution proceedings, the court learned that David was not
the children's biological father.94 Rebecca claimed that Mr. 0 had
impregnated her pursuant to an agreement with her husband, who
that any order regarding custody or visitation is specific as to time, day, place, and
manner of transfer of the child as set forth in subdivision (b) of § 6323.
CAL FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
The requirement that courts state their reasons in writing when they grant custody
to perpetrators of domestic violence acts like a presumption affecting the burden of
production. If no evidence is produced to show that the child's best interests would
be served by being in the custody of the violent parent, it is presumed that custody
with the abusive parent would be detrimental. However, once such evidence is
introduced, the court may weigh the evidence freely. Requiring reasoning in writing
assures that some positive evidence of best interests in the perpetrator's custody has
been introduced.
California subsequently upgraded its treatment of domestic violence in child
custody cases to a presumption affecting the entire burden of proof (production and
persuasion). CAL FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2000).
89. An example of a straightforward mistake that does not involve a legal presumption
is Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1999). In that child custody case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by permitting expert testimony to the effect
that the mother's involvement in an interracial relationship could harm the child. Parker, 986
S.W.2d at 557. Consideration of such racial factors in child custody matters has been held by
the United States Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984).
90. In re Marriage of Rebecca and David R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
91. In re Marriage of R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 732.
92. Id. at 732.
93. Id. at 733.
94. Id. at 731.
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was unable to father children.9 5 David claimed that he was able to
have children and that he had no knowledge of any agreement for
his wife to become pregnant by another man.96 David testified that
he believed the children were biologically his and had treated them
97 He also believed that the
as his natural children since their birth.
98
children considered him their father.
Mr. 0 testified that, although he had never discussed the matter
with David, he understood from discussions with Rebecca that he
was assisting the couple by impregnating her.99 No evidence
demonstrated that Mr. 0 ever had any interest in acting as a father
to the children, or that he had any desire to do so in the future.1°
David raised the paternity issue during mediation proceedings,
claiming that he was not the children's biological father and should
not have to pay child support.'0 ' The children were four and nine
years old when the issue of their paternity was raised. °2
Under California law, a husband who is not impotent or sterile is
presumed to be the father of any children born to his wife while
they are married and living together. 103 This presumption may be
rebutted by blood test evidence, but only during the first two years
after a child's birth.1°4 During that two-year period, the woman's
husband may make requests for blood tests, a presumed father who
is not the woman's husband, the child through a guardian ad litem,
or the mother, if her request is supported by an affidavit from the
child's biological father acknowledging paternity.1°5 After the
two-year period has expired, however, the presumption becomes
conclusive and is treated as a substantive rule of law that is no
longer rebuttable. 106
By the time the paternity issue was raised in In re Marriage of
R., the statutory two-year window for challenging the presumption
of David's paternity had long since passed. 0 7 Nevertheless, the
mediator, unaware of the existence or significance of the
presumption, recommended that blood tests be ordered. 0 8 Per95. Id. at 732-33.
96. In re Marriageof R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 733 n.3.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 733.
100. Id.
101. In re Marriageof R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 733.
102. Id.
103. CAL FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2000). See also, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
113 (1989).
104. CAL FAM. CODE § 7541 (b) & (c) (West 2000).
105. See In re Marriage of R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 733-34 (discussing CAL FAm. CODE §§
7540-41).
106. Id. at 734.
107. As discussed above, the children were already four and nine years old at the time
the dissolution petition was filed. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
108. In re Marriageof R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 733.
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haps because mediators frequently recommend blood tests in
appropriate situations, and perhaps because judges have come to
rely on mediator recommendations without personally examining
the record in each case, the mediator's recommendation in this
case was not suspect by the judge, who subsequently signed the
order for the blood tests recommended by the mediator, and the
tests confirmed that David was not the children's biological
father. 10
The case was referred to a different judge for trial.110 David
introduced the blood test evidence in the trial court to support his
argument that he need not pay child support because the children
were not biologically his.' At trial, the central legal issue was
whether the blood test evidence should be allowed to rebut the
statutory presumption of paternity." 2 The trial judge, realizing the
error in ordering the blood tests, held that the blood test evidence
was irrelevant under the California statute."' 3 Accordingly, David
was found to be the children's legal father pursuant to the statutory
and was ordered to pay child support." 4 David
presumption
5
appealed."1
In a ruling that threatened to reshape California law, the6
California Court of Appeals reluctantly reversed the decision."
While agreeing with the trial court that David was legally precluded
from challenging the statutory presumption of paternity, the court
noted that it was not David, but the family mediator, who
requested the blood tests." 7 Under these circumstances, the court
found that the trial court had discretion to order blood tests." 8 In a
troublesome finding, the appellate court determined that once
blood tests have been ordered, paternity must be resolved in
accordance with the outcome of the tests." 9 Thus, the purportedly
"conclusive" presumption of the husband's paternity of children
20
born to his wife during the marriage was effectively rebutted.'
While the court of appeals felt legally constrained to
acknowledge the blood test results, its opinion left little doubt that
a mistake had been made:
Judge J. McIntyre, when presented with the family mediator's
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73942.
In re Marriageof R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 741-42.
Id.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 736.
In re Marriageof R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 736-37.
Id. at 741-43.
Id. at 737.
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recommendation for blood testing, ordered blood testing under
section 7551. This would have been an appropriate case for
the trial court to refuse to exercise its discretion to order
blood testing....
When the blood test results were presented to Judge Van
Frank, he attempted to disregard the results of the blood tests.
However, at that time, it was too late in the process to ignore
the blood test results.... As a result, the court is now forced
by the blood test results to disrupt the social relationship
between the children and David R., the only father they have
ever known, to determine that121 Lee 0., an apparent stranger to
the children, is their "father."
In an unusual move, the Court of Appeal's opinion included a
proposal for legislative change that would prevent such a problem
in the future. 122
The legal community responded to this case with great concern
that it established a flawed and dangerous precedent. 123 Experts
claimed the opinion would upset California's 125-year-old legal
precedent and undermine important social policies. 124 Attorneys
asked the California Supreme Court to strike down the ruling. 125 On
July 30, 1997 the California Supreme Court ordered the opinion
depublished so that it could not be cited as precedent in future
cases.126
C. Unable to Assume Legal Role Due to Inadequate Legal
Knowledge
A more complicated problem occurs when mental health
professionals are asked to make custody recommendations in cases
covered by presumptions that require interpretation for their
121. Id. at 741-42.
122. The court suggested the statute be amended to allow the court discretion to
determine paternity when considering blood tests so such factors as the child's age, degree
of bonding with the presumed father, and presence or absence of relationship with the
biological father could be considered. Id. at 743.
123. Davan Maharaj, Sex, Laws and Fatherhood - And a Court to Sort it Out; LA.
TiMEs, June 9, 1997, at A3; These Days with Gloria Penner: What is a Father?(KPBS radio
broadcast, June 12, 1997); Hon. Dennis A. Cornell, Commentary, 1997 CAL oRNiA F muLY LAW
MONTHLY 163 (June 1997).
124. Maharaj, supra note 123, at A3.
125. Id.
126. In re Marriage of R., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730. It would seem that the substantial
publicity given to the mistaken application of the paternity presumption in this case would
have been sufficient to make mental health professionals aware of its existence and
application, especially because the presumption at issue was conclusive and required no
interpretation for its application. Yet, when the author mentioned the conclusive presumption
of paternity to a group of Family Court Services' mediators some time thereafter, it was
surprising that the vast majority of the fifty-plus FCS mediators remained unaware of the
presumption. Presentation to Family Court Services, Training Workshop in San Diego, Ca.
(July 17, 1997).
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application. Determining children's best interests in cases involving
rebuttable presumptions requires application of legal knowledge
that mental health professionals generally do not possess. When
rebuttable presumptions apply, it is essential that the mental health
professional know both the procedural effects of the presumption
and how it may be rebutted. However, without significant
understanding of legal concepts, such as the burdens of production,
persuasion, and proof, the standard of proof, preponderance of the
evidence, and clear and convincing evidence, mental health
professionals cannot incorporate the effects of legal presumptions
into their custody recommendations. Because recommendations
that do not properly consider these effects are not in compliance
with the law, they are of little use to judges who must apply that
law.
Judicial discretion has recently been narrowed through various
procedural devices, including rebuttable presumptions, in custody
cases involving domestic violence. In 1990, the U.S. Congress
unanimously adopted a resolution urging states to include in their
27
child custody laws a presumption against custody for batterers.'
In 1994, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
approved a Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence that
contained a rebuttable presumption against awards of sole or joint
custody to abusive parents.'12 More than forty jurisdictions
currently require consideration of domestic violence in child
custody determinations. 29 Several states have adopted rebuttable
presumptions against awarding
sole or joint custody to perpetrators
3°
of domestic violence.'
North Dakota's experience with creating and applying
presumptions to prevent awarding custody to perpetrators of
domestic violence is instructive for its classic step-wise
progression.1 31 In 1989, the North Dakota Legislature amended the
state's child custody statute to explicitly direct courts, for the first
time, to consider evidence of domestic violence when making best
interests determinations.1 32
In 1991, apparently in response to cases in which custody
127. H. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1990)(enacted).
128. MODEL CODE ON DormEsnc AND FAMILY VIOLENCE §401 (Advisory Committee of the
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, Model Code Project of the Family Violence Project 1994).
129. Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody Disputes When One Parent
Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1113, 1119 (1996).
130. Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal
Practice,29 FAM. L Q. 197, 208 (1995). See supra note 88 for California's statutory language.
131. See Ruth Jenny & Kelly Gaines Stoner, Domestic Violence and the North Dakota
Best Interests Statute, 72 N.D. L REv. 1011 (1996).
132. Id. at 1013 (citing S. Res. 2398, 51st Leg., 1989 N.D. Law 547, which requires
courts to determine whether domestic violence had occurred and, if it had, to tailor custody
and visitation arrangements to protect the child and victim parent).
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continued to be awarded to perpetrators of domestic violence, the
child custody statute was again amended to create a rebuttable
presumption against awarding custody to abusive parents.' 33 The
North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted this statutory provision in
a 1992 case, Schestler v. Schestler, as a presumption affecting the
burden of production. 134 The father in Schestler was found to have
abused his wife during the marriage by shoving and striking her,
and to have "teased" his two stepdaughters by touching or
"twisting" their breasts. 35 Despite these findings, the Chief of
Psychological Services at the North Central Human Services Center
in Minot recommended that the father's biological children be
136 The trial court followed the psychologist's
placed in his custody.
37
recommendation.1
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision, finding that the trial court had properly applied the
statutory presumption, which was successfully rebutted by a
combination of other statutory factors favoring the father.' 38 These
factors included the lack of evidence that the father had been
violent toward his biological children, his more stable home
environment, more love and affection between him and the
children, and the availability of child care assistance from his
mother and sisters.1m
As previously discussed, when a presumption affects only the
burden of production, a party who proves the basic fact is entitled
to have the presumed fact taken as proved, unless the opposing
40
party introduces some evidence to disprove the presumed fact.
Thus, in the context of a child custody case involving domestic
violence, a parent who proves that the other parent has committed
domestic violence is entitled to a presumption that it is in the best
interests of the child not to be placed in the custody of the violent
parent. However, this presumption lasts only until the opposing
party introduces evidence to disprove the presumed fact, i.e.,
evidence tending to show that it is in the child's best interests to
be placed in the abusive party's custody. Once this contradictory
evidence is introduced, the presumption disappears and the facts
133. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509, 511-14 (N.D. 1992) (citing a reference in
legislative history to Dizayee v. Dizayee, 414 N.W.2d 606 (N.D. Ct. App. 1987)).
Once the presumption was invoked through presentation of credible evidence of domestic
violence, the statute required the trial court to make findings showing that its custody and
visitation orders provided adequate protection for the child, the victim parent, and other
family or household members. See supra note 55 (discussing the burden of production).
134. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 513.
137. Id. at 512.
138. Id.
139. Schestier, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
140. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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are weighed as usual.'4 1
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Schestler explained that,
while domestic violence was one factor to be considered in
custody cases, other statutory factors must also be considered.
Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's interpretation that the presumption against awarding
custody to perpetrators of domestic violence
could be rebutted by
142
a combination of other statutory factors.
In Schestler, the court interpreted the applicable presumption to
affect only the burden of production; accordingly, the presumption
disappeared when the father introduced evidence to contradict it.
From that point on, the judge had complete discretion to weigh the
various considerations raised by the facts. Because the judge had
full discretion, the psychologist's recommendation could not run
afoul of the law. However, as discussed below, because a new
statutory presumption affects the entire burden of proof,
professional recommendations may easily diverge from the law. In
1993, the North Dakota legislature responded to the Schestler
court's interpretation of the rebuttable presumption by amending its
child custody statute yet again.143 In an attempt to clarify domestic
violence as the paramount factor in determining the best interest of
the child, the amendment specified that the presumption affects the
entire burden of proof, i.e., the burden of persuasion as well as the
burden of production. The presumption was further strengthened
by elevating the standard of proof for rebuttal from "preponderance
of the evidence" to "clear and convincing evidence." 144
Bruner v. Hager was decided in 1995, after the North Dakota
legislature strengthened the statutory presumption against awarding
custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence to a rebuttable
presumption affecting the entire burden of proof.145 In Bruner,
custody was awarded to a violent father after the trial court heard
a significant quantity of evidence from several mental health
professionals.1 46 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court found
that the statutory presumption against placing custody with a
violent parent had not been appropriately recognized. 47 The
reviewing court criticized the trial court's findings of fact as
improperly excusing the father's abusive behavior toward the
mother as past, minimal, and not directed toward his son. The
North Dakota Supreme Court noted that these findings were based,
in part, on a psychologist's evaluation report that failed to raise any
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
Bruner v. Hager ("Bruner I'), 547 N.W.2d 551, 553 (N.D. 1996).
ND. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (Supp. 1997).
Bruner v. Hager ("Bruner I'), 534 N.W.2d 825, 828 (N.D. 1995).
Bruner II, 547 N.W.2d at 554.
Bruner 1, 534 N.W.2d at 826-27.

288

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:265

concerns about the father's parenting abilities. 48 As a result, the
case was remanded for express findings regarding the domestic
violence and a redetermination of custody in compliance with the
statutory presumption.149 After a new trial, custody was awarded to
the mother and upheld on appeal.1'0
The evaluation report in Bruner raised concerns about the ability
of mental health professionals to recognize and evaluate domestic
violence in custody settings. In particular, it raised questions about
whether the psychologist understood and correctly applied North
Dakota's statutory presumption against awarding custody to
perpetrators of domestic violence.
The new presumption, in effect when Bruner was decided,
shifted the entire burden of proof (both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion) to the violent parent. This means
that, even if the violent parent were to introduce evidence that he
was a "good parent" in spite of his domestic violence, he would
still retain the burden of persuading the judge by clear and
convincing evidence that the child's best interests required that he,
rather than the non-violent parent, be named custodian.
Presumptions shifting the entire burden of proof constrain
judicial discretion significantly more than presumptions affecting
only the burden of production. With greater constraints on the
judge's discretion, the inability of mental health professionals to
understand and sufficiently incorporate the effects legal presumptions are much more likely to result in unlawful custody
recommendations. Legally flawed recommendations are not helpful
to judges, who must then independently determine and weigh
material facts in light of relevant legal considerations.
The mental health professional's role in applying this more
restrictive statutory presumption was directly examined in.Owan v.
Owan.15 1 Although the record in Owan contained significant
evidence of domestic violence perpetrated against the mother by
the child's father, the trial court minimized and excused the father's
violent conduct. 152 The trial court's single written finding on the
issue of domestic violence was based on the testimony and opinion
of a social worker.' Excerpts from the trial transcript reflect the
concern of the mother's lawyer that the social worker's custody
recommendation did not incorporate the procedural advantage the
legislature intended to accord to non-violent parents through the
148. Id. at 828.
149. Id. at 829.
150. Bruner II, 547 N.W.2d at 552.
151. 541 N.W.2d 719, 721 (N.D. 1996).
152. Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 720.
153. The social worker reported to the court that the "allegations of [father's] physical
altercations appear to be minor. In most cases, [mother] has acted and [father] has reacted."
Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 721.
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statutory presumption.
Q. Did you analyze that violent behavior in light of the
presumption in the Century Code that absent other factors, the
non-violent party is given a nod so to speak under the
categories that are analyzed? How did you weigh that, if at all?
A. I guess I did not feel that it met the same level of violent
behavior that I would, I guess I Q. You didn't apply the presumption basically, is that fair?
A. I don't think that I held that what had happened in that
case as meeting that standard that the Court is looking for as
a determining factor.154
The reviewing court in Owan determined that to the extent that
the trial court had adopted the findings of the social worker, it had
improperly delegated its statutory duty to weigh the evidence and
make findings on domestic violence.'The continued refinement of the legal issues related to the
application of the statutory presumption against awarding custody
to violent parents by the North Dakota courts has complicated the
already problematic relationship between mental health professionals and the courts in child custody proceedings where legal
presumptions apply.' 6
D. Resistance to Substantive Content of Presumption
A different kind of problem arises in custody proceedings when a
mental health professional's values conflict with the substantive
content of governing legal presumptions. California's experience
with its "move-away" presumption provides a concrete example of
how this conflict can lead mental health professionals to resist
application of the governing law.
As previously discussed, the discretion of trial courts with regard
to move-away custody disputes in California was narrowed in In re
Marriage of Burgess by judicial recognition of a presumption
favoring the custodial parent's ability to relocate. 157 Prior to the
154. Id. at 721.
155. Id. at 722. It is likely that the social worker did not understand, and thus could
not incorporate, the procedural effects of the statutory presumption into his
recommendations. While on one hand, the social worker's assistance to the court is limited if
he does not incorporate the procedural effects of the presumption into his recommendations,
on the other, asking the social worker to do so may be tantamount to asking him to engage
in the practice of law.
156. Issues of particular interest include whether the presumption can be triggered
when both parents are violent, when only property has been damaged, when there has been
only one act of physical abuse, or where there has been only emotional abuse. Jenny &
Stoner, supra note 131, at 1021-25. The difficult question of what constitutes the clear and
convincing evidence necessary to rebut the presumption has also received significant judicial
attention. Id. at 1022-24.
157. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
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California Supreme Court's 1996 ruling in Burgess, the decision
whether to allow a custodial parent to move with the children out
of the jurisdiction was a matter within the discretion of the trial
court. Under pre-Burgess law, custody awards were often made "to
mother, unless she moves, then to father."
The Burgess Court significantly changed the legal framework for
move-away cases, declaring that a custodial parent is presumptively
entitled to move with the children unless the non-custodial parent
can demonstrate that the move would be so detrimental to the
child that a change in custody was "essential or expedient for the
welfare of the child." 158 However, there are indications that because
of their professional training, mental health professionals are
predisposed to favor joint custody; therefore, they resist applying
California's move-away presumption.' 59
1.

ProfessionalBias in Favor of Joint Custody

The substantive content of the Burgess move-away presumption
preserves continuity in the child's primary caretaking relationship,
rather than fostering joint custody. However, this stands in sharp
contrast to the professional values of some mental health
professionals who favor joint custody and shared parenting.
Evidence suggests that many social workers, mediators, and
psychologists have a professional bias favoring joint custody.
Professor Martha Fineman details how the therapeutic ideology
of social work shapes a joint custody bias. She observes that social
work theory views divorce primarily as an emotional crisis for
families, rather than as a legal event. 160 According to this view, the
spouses' relationship is not terminated at divorce, but instead
restructured through therapeutic processes controlled and
monitored by mental health professionals into a post-divorce
shared parenting model.1 6' The legal approach of choosing one
parent for sole custody is antithetical to this family systems view. 62
Rather than focusing on the best parent to assume custody, social
workers seek to restructure the family with equal parental rights as
the primary goal.16s Fineman thus concludes that social workers
have a professional bias in favor of a specific substantive result:
shared parenting or joint custody.'6
158. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 482. See also supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
159. In recent California cases, appellate courts have begun to scrutinize mental health
professionals' custody recommendations to determine if they comport with the Burgess
move-away presumption.
160. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,Professional Language, and Legal Change
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HAv. L REV. 727, 747 (1988).
161. Id. at 745.
162. Id. at 750.
163. FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 149.
164. Id. at 146.
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Analogously, Professor Trina Grillo reports that many mediators
"state unabashedly that they attempt to steer their clients toward
joint custody, regardless of what the clients want."165 Indeed, she
reports that some mediators caution parents that a refusal to agree
to joint custody may result in custody being awarded to the other
"friendlier" parent. 16 Available evidence suggests that mediators are
6v
in fact influencing outcomes toward more joint custody.
Moreover, recent professional books indicate that many
psy-chologists conducting custody evaluations also have a
predisposition towards joint custody.168
2.

Bias Creates the Risk of Resistance to Presumptions

The bias of many mental health professionals in favor of joint
custody cause a resistance to applying laws aimed at protecting the
primary caretaking relationship in relocation cases. Such resistance
is apparent in the legislative history surrounding a 1993 California
bill that would have created a move-away presumption. The bill
was strenuously opposed by groups promoting joint custody, whose
comments were intended to demean and pathologize custodial
mothers who made post-divorce decisions that did not elevate their
ex-husbands' "frequent and continuing contact" with the children
above considerations of their own well being. 169 In parody of the
traditional precedent promoting continuity of primary caretaking
relationships, custodial mothers were referred to pejoratively as
"primary controllers" instead of "primary caretakers." 7 0° The bill
7
died in conunittee.1 1
Two years later, after developing the legal issues through briefs
and oral argument, the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage
of Burgess judicially recognized the move-away presumption. 172
Under Burgess, California courts are obliged to apply the
rebuttable legal presumption that a custodial parent is allowed to
move and retain custody of the children. Nevertheless, anecdotal
reports from both northern and southern California indicate that
165. Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L
J. 1545, 1594 (1991).
166. Id. at 1594-95; see also, Joan Zorza, "FriendlyParent" Provisions in Custody
Determinations, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 921, 922 (1992).
167. Marsha Kline Pruett et al., Divorcing Families with Young Children in the
Court's Family Services Unit: Profiles and Impact of Services, 38 FAM. & CONCMLATION CTS,
REv. 478, 487 (2000); Douglass D. Knowlton & Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Mediation in the
Presence of Domestic Violence: Is It the Light at the End of the Tunnel or Is a Train on the
Track?, 70 N.D. L REv. 255, 268 (1994).
168. STAHL, supra note 27, at 9; GOULD, supra note 32, at 242.
169. CoMmrrrEE RFoRT OF 1993 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL No. 1350, 1993-94 Regular
Session, SENATE CoMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY at 2. [hereinafter CoMmITrEE REPORT].
170. Testimony on S.1350 (move-away bill) before the California Senate Judiciary
Committee, May 3, 1994 (author testified as an expert witness at these hearings).
171. CoMMrrrEE REPoRT, supra note 169, at 1.
172. See supra notes 67-75, 85.
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FCS personnel continue to recommend move-away restrictions
despite the new presumption favoring the ability of custodial
7 3
parents to relocate without losing custody of their children.
Custody evaluators also continue to recommend relocation
restrictions. For example, in a recent California case, a custody
evaluator recommended that the custodial parent not be allowed to
change the residence of the children, even within the county,
without the written agreement of the other parent or a court
order.'74 The evaluator recommended a comprehensive plan of
individual and conjoint therapy for all family members, and a
complicated split custody arrangement intended to achieve an
eventual fifty-fifty sharing of custody between the parents.
Restricting of the mother's residence was recommended to
plan for custody, which he referred to as a
facilitate the evaluator's
"work in progress."175 Thus, the psychologist disregarded (if even
considered) the legally controlling Burgess presumption, favoring
the custodial parent relocating with the children, in favor of his
own psychological plan for the case.
3.

Compliance with Presumptions Is
Scrutiny

Subject to Legal

Recent appellate court opinions in California have scrutinized the
reports and recommendations of mental health professionals for
compliance with California's move-away law. In Ruisi v. Thieriot,
the trial court refused to allow the custodial mother to move to
Rhode Island with her eight-year-old son because it would disrupt
the father's established patterns of visitation. 176 The Court of
Appeals noted that the decision was abiding by the law in effect at
the time of the decision, but that the law had changed during the
pendency of the appeal.'1
In explaining the requirements of the new move-away
presumption, the reviewing court focused on the recommendation
of the court-appointed psychologist. The appellate court suggested
that the trial court's construction of the issues was shaped by the
psychologist's evaluation/recommendation, which was incorrectly
focused under the current law.'78 The case was remanded with
explicit directions about the legal issue to be addressed by the trial
court, and thus by the court-appointed expert:
[W]hen the trial court is faced with a request to modify the
173.
174.
Honorable
175.
176.
177.
178.

Interviews with Academics, Attorneys, and Custodial Parents.
Barnes v. Barnes, Case No. D-372447, Transcript of Proceedings Before the
William S. Cannon, San Diego, Ca. (Oct. 23, 1997) at 36-37.
Id. at 91.
Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 770 (Cal. App. 1997).
Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768.
Id. at 769.
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existing custody arrangement on account of a parent's plan to
move away,... the trial court must treat the plan as a serious
one and must decide the custody issues based upon that
premise. The question for the trial court is not whether the
parent may be permitted to move; the question is what
arrangement for custody should be made. 79
The reviewing court thus obliquely reminded the trial court of its
responsibility to apply the law, even if the custody evaluator did
not.
The court-appointed expert in In re Marriage of Edlund
specifically declined to make a recommendation on the move-away
issue, declaring that the judge should decide the legal issues
involved.' s° The content of his evaluation report was, nevertheless,
closely scrutinized on appeal.
The mother in Edlund left her native mid-western home to move
to California with her husband.' 8' The couple separated shortly
after the birth of their daughter and the father moved to another
city, where he began a romantic relationship with a high school
student.' s2 In the dissolution order, the father was awarded
visitation with his daughter every other weekend with additional
time on holidays.1s3 He did not seek a larger share of responsibility
for his daughter's care because of his work schedule at a fitness
club and, over time, failed to exercise all of his visitation time.1s4
The mother became engaged to a man who worked for United
Airlines, and when he received a job transfer to Indianapolis, the
mother sought a modification of custody to allow her daughter to
also move to Indiana.' s5 The trial court granted the modification to
accommodate the move and the father appealed.1 86
In reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals began by noting that
the move-away presumption articulated in Burgess placed a burden
on the non-custodial father to establish that his 2-year-old daughter
would suffer such detriment as a result of the mother's move to
Indiana that it would be essential or expedient for the child's
welfare that custody be transferred. 8 7 The court looked to the
report of the court-appointed expert for evidence of such
detriment.
The court first considered the conclusory assertion in the
expert's report that the child would be "significantly negatively
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 771 (emphasis in original).
Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 682.
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impacted" by the separation from her father.'88 Breaking down this
assertion, the court identified two apparent sources of detriment:
(1) that the child would wind up "being fathered primarily by a
step-father;" and (2) that the father would not be "involved in the
primary parenting or typical parent-child activities as she grows
older.'189
The court rejected the first source of detriment observing that
fathering by a stepfather would occur upon the mother's
remarriage, regardless of whether a move was authorized.' 90 As to
the second source, the court noted that the father had never played
more than a minimal role in his daughter's day-to-day care, and his
established pattern of behavior did not suggest he would take
advantage of having more time with her, even were it available.' 9'
The court commented that every child who had any meaningful
relationship with the non-custodial parent would likely be
"significantly negatively impacted" by a move to a distant
location. 19 If such evidence of detriment were sufficient to deny a
move-away order, no custodial parent would ever be able to
relocate. The Court of Appeals thus rejected the evidence of
detriment in the expert's report as being legally insufficient under
the Burgess presumption. 193
The reviewing court also criticized a statement in the expert's
report reflecting the expert's professional bias toward joint custody
in the face of California's move-away presumption. In his report,
the expert opined "the best possible scenario for Natalie would be
for her parents to remain in the Bay area, sort out their lives and
allow her to have the benefit of the love and attention of both
parents and extended families." 94 The reviewing court admonished,
"to the extent Dr. Perlmutter considered this a realistic option he
was supposed to evaluate for the court, Dr. Perlmutter was
mistaken."

195

Problems associated with the unwillingness, inability, or
resistance of mental health professionals to apply the legally
controlling presumptions in child custody proceedings requires
re-evaluation of the proper role of social workers, mediators, and
psychologists in such proceedings.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 683-84.
Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684.
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SHOULD MENTAL HEALTH

PROFESSIONALS MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE ULTIMATE ISSUE OF CHILD CUSTODY?

The trend to reintroduce principles of decision into best interests
determinations through the use of legal presumptions both
highlights and exacerbates the difficulties encountered with the
involvement of mental health professionals in child custody
proceedings. There has been significant disagreement within the
mental health community about whether expert opinions should be
offered on the ultimate issue of custody under the best interests
standard.' 96 Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly
allow such testimony,' 97 some state statutes provide for it,'19 judges
often request it,'99 and professional standards of practice leave it
available as an option, 2°° the general academic consensus is that
mental health professionals exceed their scientific expertise when
they state an expert opinion on the ultimate legal issue of child
20
custody. '
This consensus has, until now, been based on two main
contentions. First, there is inadequate scientific knowledge relevant
to the legal issues posed in custody disputes to justify claims of
196. MARC. J. ACKERMAN & ANDREW W. KANE, PSYCHOLOGICAL ExPERTS IN DIVORCE ACTIONS
2-3 (3d ed. 1998); see also Melton, supra note 31, at 3; David M. Brodzinsky, On the Use and
Misuse of Psychological Testing in Child Custody Evaluations, 24 PROF. PSYCHOL RES. &
PRAcT. 213 (1994); Bolocofsky, supra note 26, at 198.
197. FED. R Evin. 704 states:
(a) except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. (b) No expert witness testifying with respect
to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state
or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.
Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
FED. R EvlD. 704.
198. California, for example, provides by statute that court-connected mediators "may,
consistent with local court rules, submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of
or visitation with the child." CAL FAM. CODE § 3183 (a) (West 2000).
199. "Some judges insist that only they will answer the ultimate issue. Other judges
expect the expert to provide the court with an answer to the ultimate issue." GOULD, supra
note 32, at 28; "Some judges never read the report itself, looking only at the
recommendations and the bottom line. Other judges, although they care about the
recommendations, wish to understand the evaluator's assessment of the family in order to
make their own rulings." STAm supra note 27, at 136.
200. APA Guidelines, supra note 33, at 54-58. While Guideline 4 instructs that "[t]he
psychologist does not act as a judge, who makes the ultimate decision applying the law to
all relevant evidence," Guideline 14 acknowledges that "the profession has not reached
consensus about whether psychologists ought to make recommendations about the final
custody determination to the courts" and cautions psychologists that they "are obligated to
be aware of the arguments on both sides of this issue and to be able to explain the logic of
their position concerning their own practice."
201. See, e.g., MELTON, supra note 31, at 488-89; Thomas Grisso, Evolving Guidelines
for Divorce/Custody Evaluations, 28 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 35, 40 (1990); Bolocofsky,
supra note 26, at 205; Bill Swann, The Dangers in Using Court-Appointed Experts in Child
Custody Cases, 27 JUDGES' J. 17, 18 (1988); Donald N. Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial
System: BroaderPerspectives, 10 L & HuM. BEnAv. 151, 160 (1986).
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making "expert" custody recommendations. Second, the ultimate
issues of custody and visitation involve moral and value judgments
that are outside scientific expertise but are properly in the province
of the trial judge. The reintroduction of legal presumptions into
custody law adds a third basis for this position: mental health
professionals do not possess the legal expertise needed to correctly
apply the applicable child custody law.
A.

Scientific Expertise

Professional literature has raised serious questions about
whether mental health professionals possess sufficient scientific
expertise to make custody recommendations. One concern about
the scientific underpinnings of custody decision-making is the lack
of directly relevant empirical research.
1.

Lack of Relevant Research

While some research comparing the effects of various custody
arrangements on the well being of children after divorce has been
conducted, this research necessarily looks at large group
differences on unrefined dimensions such as joint versus sole
custody.210
The types of data derived from these large group comparisons
provide no scientific support for the detailed custody and visitation
20 3
recommendations that must be made in individual custody cases.
Simply stated, the factors typically considered in choosing between
parents are not empirically supported. There is no data, for
example, comparing the effects of consistent discipline by one
parent to the effects of interpersonal warmth in the other.2 4 There
is no data on the effects of small variations in parents' personality
structures, adjustment patterns, or intellectual capabilities on a
child's later adjustment. Indeed, no empirical data exists to
202. See Joan B. Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment in Children of Divorce: Converging
Findings and Implicationsfor Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL 119 (1988); Michael Benjamin &
Howard H. Irving, Shared Parenting: CriticalReview of the Research Literature, 27 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 21 (1989); Judith S. Wallerstein & Janet R. Johnston, Children of
Divorce. Recent Findings Regarding Long-Term Effects and Recent Studies of Joint and
Sole Custody, 11 PEDIATRICS REV. 197 (1990); Margaret Crosbie-Burnett, Impact of Joint
versus Sole Custody and Quality of Co-parentalRelationship on Adjustment of Adolescents
in Remarried Families, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 439 (1991); Janet R. Johnston, Children's
Adjustment in Sole Custody Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for
Custody Decision Making, 33 Fm. & CONCLuTnON CTS. REV. 415 (1995).
203. MELTON, supra note 31, at 12-13.
204. Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29
RutrGms L REV. 1117, 1143-44 (1976). Indeed, Opaku suggests that in the absence of
empirical data establishing that less than perfect consistency by a parent has negative effects
on a child and that the benefits of consistency outweigh the emotional trauma of separating
a child from its primary caretaking parent, an opinion suggesting an award to the more
consistent non-caretaking parent would lack scientific support and would be no better than
the opinion of a lay person who has strong views about the importance of "consistency." Id.
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establish how personality disorders relate to parents' ability to care
for their children. 205 The context of custody involves many
confounding and uncontrolled variables that are difficult, if not
impossible,
to account for through statistical design or statistical
26
methods. 0
2.

Psychological Testing Concerns

A second area of concern about the science underlying child
custody decision-making centers on the use of psychological tests
in custody evaluations.
a.

The Tests

One criticism is that the test instruments themselves are
scientifically inadequate. Standard psychological tests such as the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory ("MMPI"), the
Rorschach, and the Thematic Apperception Test ("TAT") were
developed for clinical, rather than forensic use.20 7 Professor
Bolocofsky cautions that the MMPI "was developed as a gross
screening device for severe psychiatric disorders and its intended
use was to identify significant psychopathology, not the small
differences in relatively mild pathologies more often found in
parties to a custody dispute." 2°s Yet, the MMPI is one of the
traditional measures used most frequently by forensic psychologists
in child custody evaluations. 2°9 The usefulness of current standard
psychological tests of intelligence, personality, or psychopathology,
without scientific validation
for use in child custody contexts, has
210
been plainly questioned.
New measures such as the Bricklin Perceptual Scales (measuring
children's perception of each parent) and ASPECT
205. Brodzinsky, supra note 196, at 215. Indeed, Brodzinsky reports a case where the
psychologist diagnosed the mother with a histrionic personality disorder at the same time
acknowledging that she had been an adequate caregiver. In spite of her past care-giving
history, custody was awarded to the father. Id.
206. MELTON, supra note 31, at 484. Melton also points out that ethical barriers to the
random assignment of children to comparison groups make it unlikely that such research
could ever be conducted at a level specific enough to be applicable in individual custody
cases. Id. See also Thomas R. Litwack et al., The Proper Role of Psychology in Child
Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAm. L. 269, 277-79 (1979-80).
However, even if significant advances in scientific knowledge are achieved, it is not clear
more accurate custody evaluations would result in light of findings that clinicians often do
not stay current with empirical research. HOwARD N. GARB, STUDYING THE CLINICIAN: JUDGMENT
RESEARCH AND PSYCHOLOGIcAL ASSESSMENT 37 (1998).

207. STAHL, supra note 27, at 55.
208. Bolocofsky, supra note 26, at 207.
209. Dennis P Saccuzzo, Still Crazy After All These Years: California'sPersistent Use
of the MMPI as CharacterEvidence in Criminal Cases, 33 U.S.F.L REV. 379, 380 (1999).
210. Brodzinsky, supra note 196, at 214. But see, MARC J. AcKERMAN, CuNiciAN's GUIDE
TO CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 108-09 (1995); Kirk Heilbrun, The Role of Psychological Testing
in ForensicAssessment, 16 L & HUM. BEHAV. 257, 268-69 (1992).
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(Ackerman-Schoendorf Parent Evaluation for Custody Test) were
developed specifically for use in custody evaluations. 21' Even these
measures have been criticized, however, for their lack of
demonstrated reliability and validity, the unrealistic or untested
assumptions they contain, and problems with the sample
populations through which they were developed. 21 2 Although in
apparent agreement that independent validation studies are needed
for these new measures, no professional consensus seems to exist
about whether the data should be validated against judicial
decisions, relitigation rates, measures of child outcomes, or other
criteria.213 Without such validation, even these newly developed
measures cannot be used with confidence.
b.

Overuse and Misuse of Tests

Another criticism of psychological testing is that the tests are
commonly overused or misused by custody evaluators. The overuse
criticism stems from evaluators routinely administering batteries of
psychological tests without clearly relating
the information
21 4
gathered to the substantive issues in a case.
In spite of challenges to the forensic relevance of psychological
test results in custody cases, one study found that nearly
three-quarters of the professionals surveyed routinely used these
tests for custody purposes. 21 David Brodzinsky has suggested
several explanations for this widespread overuse of psychological
tests in custody proceedings including: (1) psychologists do not
understand legal issues; (2) lawyers and judges do not understand
the limitations of psychological evidence and thus pressure
psychologists to report test results; (3) psychologists use test
administration to differentiate themselves from psychiatrists and
social workers;
and (4) there are financial incentives to doing more
216
testing.
The misuse criticism is more straightforward, claiming that the
psychological tests in child custody cases are often simply
211. MELTON,supra note 31, at 503.
212. Id. at 504.
213. Brodzinsky, supra note 196, at 218.
214. Id. at 217.
215. A survey of experienced professionals revealed that nearly three quarters of them
routinely use psychological tests in their child custody evaluations. William G. Keilin and
Larry J. Bloom, Child Custody EvaluationPractices:A Survey of Experienced Professionals,
17 PROF. PSYCHOL R-s. & PRAcT. 338, 340 (1986).
Philip Michael Stahl, in his book about performing custody evaluations, reports that he
uses traditional psychological tests as part of his standard evaluation procedure to help
ensure that he does not miss anything. He says that "[ilf I chose to do psychological testing
only some of the time, I might miss something that would have shown up in the
psychological testing of a particular parent." STAHL, supra note 27, at 56.
216. Brodzinsky, supra note 196, at 216-17.
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217
administered, scored, and interpreted erroneously.

3.

Shortcomings of Clinical Expertise

A third area of concern with regard to the scientific credibility of
child custody recommendations involves the clinical expertise of
custody investigators, evaluators, and counselors. Psychologists,
even those who perform psychological testing, rely heavily on their
clinical experience in performing custody evaluations.21 8 Research
on clinician performance, however, indicates that clinicians are not
skillful at making clinical judgments for normal populations. 219 The
degree to which judgments agree when two or more clinicians are
asked to make clinical judgments based on identical information
about the same client is known as "interrater reliability." 20 While
the interrater reliability of clinicians has been found to adequately
describe psychiatric symptoms, it has been found to vary widely
when describing normal personality traits, and to 22be
consistently
1
poor when describing normal defense mechanisms.
"Incremental reliability" refers to the degree to which additional
information increases the validity of judgments. For example, the
ability to see and hear an interview might be expected to produce
more valid results than merely reading a transcript of the
interview. 2?2 Contrary to expectation, however, the incremental
validity of case history data for normal subjects either did not
change or decreased the validity of personality ratings by
clinicians. 2?s Because the vast majority of parents engaged in
custody disputes are within the range of normal functioning rather
than pathological, these findings are of concern.
Another troubling finding is that clinicians are often quite4
confident of clinical judgments that are in fact inaccurate.2
Surprisingly, the problem of overconfident and inaccurate clinical
225
performance does not improve with increased clinical experience.
One explanation for this lack of improvement with experience is
that clinicians often do not receive feedback on their
217. ACKERmAN & KANE., supra note 196, at 21-22; Jay Zisidn & David Faust, Psychiatric
and PsychologicalEvidence in Child Custody Cases, 25 TIMA 44, 48 (1989).
218. STARL, supra note 27, at 57; MELTON, supra note 31, at 485, 501.
219. GARB, supra note 206, at 19.
220. Id. at 10.
221. Id. at 36. The reliability of outcomes across different assessment instruments,
such as the MMPI, Rorschach, Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale, and vocational histories,
has also been shown to be poor. Id. at 13.
222. Id. at 18.
223. Id. at 37.
224. GARB, supra note 206, at 37.
225. Id. at 200. Indeed, Melton suggests that learning to display confidence in the
treatment being administered has placebo effects, which may enhance treatment success and
thus the success of the clinicians' practice. "The problem . . . is that if this style of
presentation is carried into the reporting of forensic evaluations, the legal factfinder may be
misled as to the certainty of the conclusions." MELTON, supra note 31, at 12.
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performance. 26 In child custody cases, for example, the evaluator
often has to choose between two fit parents. It is unlikely that the
evaluator will ever be wrong in any ultimate sense because the
child is likely to grow up reasonably well in either parent's care.
Thus, scientifically unwarranted distinctions between parents in
custody actions will rarely be judged as having been wrong based
on child outcomes.
Findings from research on clinical performance also raise
questions about the use of mental health professionals as
investigators and fact-finders. 227 There is research evidence, for
example, that clinicians tend to form conclusions prematurely and
then selectively attend to evidence that supports that conclusion. 228
Premature conclusions can result from mental health
professionals' personal or theoretical biases. Some, for example,
hold personal beliefs that religious values are important in raising
well-adjusted children or that financial status is important in
determining which parent can better meet their children's needs. 229
Some have doctrinal biases, unsupported by research, in favor of
one particular form of custody over another. 23° One well-known
commentator acknowledges, for example, that biases against
move-aways and in favor of joint custody are not uncommon
among custody evaluators. 231 Research with clinicians also shows
that social class, sexual orientation, and sex-role behavior appear
to exert important influences
on clinical judgments when
232
personality traits are rated.
4.

Situational Anomalies Accompanying Family Breakup
Prevent Accurate Assessment

Even if all the measurement techniques employed in child
custody cases were problem free, Professor David Chambers
questions whether the reliable observation of parent-child
relationships during divorce is even possible. He points out that:
[t]he period shortly after separation, when most struggles over
custody occur, is abnormally stressful. During this period, the
behavior of children and adults toward each other may bear
226. GARB, supra note 206, at 201.
227. Such use is suggested by Litwack et. al, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child
Custody Disputes, 18 J. FIAM. L 269, 283-88 (1979-80).
228. Ziskin & Faust, supra note 217, at 46; AcKERMAN & KANE, supra note 196, at 19;
Arthur D. Williams, Bias and Debiasing Techniques in Forensic Psychology, 10 Am. J.
FoRENSlC PSYCHOL 19, 20 (1992).
229. STAHL, supra note 27, at 9.
230. ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 196, at 20.
231. STAHL, supra note 27, at 9 (remarldng that "[many evaluators have a bias that
both parents need to maintain an active role in children's lives and that access to both
parents should be relatively equal"). See also supra notes 160-95 and accompanying text.
232. GARB, supra note 206, at 33, 37.
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little resemblance to the past or the future.... Even an expert
who recognizes the problem of stress may not be able to
determine
how the children or adults would behave in its
23
absence.
B.

Value Judgments

The second contention underlying the concerns about mental
health professionals making custody recommendations is that
determination of the best interests of the child cannot be resolved
through application of scientific expertise.
First, it is impossible to predict with any scientific accuracy the
comparative outcomes for a child placed in the custody of one
parent as opposed to the other. Indeed, one commentator noted
that the prediction of what will be in the best interest of the child
involves factors "of such complexity
that surely most palm readers
"234
would be reluctant to make it.
More importantly, custody determinations invariably come down
to value judgments. Robert Mnookin describes the enormity of the
task encompassed in child custody decision-making:
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less
ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself. Should the
judge be primarily concerned with the child's happiness? Or
with the child's spiritual and religious training? Should the
judge be concerned with the economic 'productivity' of the
child when he [or she] grows up? Are the primary values of
life in warm, interpersonal relationships, or in discipline and
self-sacrifice? Is stability and security for a child more
desirable than intellectual stimulation? 23
The kinds of social, moral, financial and legal concerns involved
in child custody determinations are simply outside the scientific
expertise of mental health professionals. 236 These types of concerns
are typically entrusted to the judiciary in the expectation that
community values will be reflected in their decisions.
C. Legal Considerations
The reintroduction of presumptions into custody law makes the
233.

David L Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in

Divorce, 83 MICH. L REv. 477, 483-84 (1984).
234. Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and Crystal Balls, 7
BmAV. SaL & L. 145, 153 (1989).
235. Mnookin, supra note 16, at 260. For a more recent expression of concerns about
the choice of values in custody evaluations, see Gindes, supra note 34, at 43-44.
236. GouLD, supra note 32, at 28; accord Kirk Heilbrun, The Role of Psychological
Testing in Forensic Assessment, 16 L & HUM. BEHAV. 257, 268 (1992); Gary B. Melton,
Shrinking the Power of the Expert's Word, 9 FAM. ADvoc. 22, 24-25 (1986).
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need for legal expertise yet another basis for arguing that mental
health professionals should not make reconunendations on the
ultimate issue of custody. Custody and visitation have always been
legal issues; however, their legal nature was masked under the
formless best interests standard, which could encompass almost
any expert recommendation. Custody cases under the new
presumptions, however, require the application of more specific
legal standards to facts developed in a particular case. The
application of proven facts to defined legal standards is a basic
lawyering skill. Because custody recommendations in cases covered
by legal presumptions require this distinctly legal conduct, mental
health professionals cannot make ultimate issue recommendations
in these cases without some degree of legal training.
Standards of practice for mental health professionals involved in
custody proceedings require familiarity with applicable laws in the
relevant jurisdictions.237 More than a passing familiarity with the
law is required, however, for the application of legal presumptions
to facts in a case. While training opportunities in this area are
gradually increasing, such training begs the ultimate question of
whether mental health professionals should be charged 23with
responsibility for legal decision-making in child custody cases. 8
Practical concerns, rather than scientific or legal considerations,
appear to be the primary motivating force behind the increasing
delegation of judicial responsibility to mental health professionals
in custody proceedings. When a bill was introduced into the
California legislature that would have prohibited FCS mediators
from making custody recommendations, 23 the argument leading to
the bill's quick and quiet demise was that California's family court
dockets are so overloaded that family court judges could not
possibly conduct individualized, fact-finding hearings in all disputed
custody or visitation cases. 240 If FCS personnel did not conduct the
237. American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Summary of the Practice
Parametersfor Child Custody Evaluation, 36 J. AM. AcAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PsYCIMATRY
1784, 1785 (1997); APA Guidelines, supra note 33, at 55; Committee on Ethical Guidelines,
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 658 (1991).
The American Bar Association instructs family mediators to insure that participants have a
sufficient understanding of statutory and case law by recommending that they obtain legal
representation. Standards of Practicefor Family Mediators, 17 FAm. L Q. 455, 458 (1984).
These practice standards, however, do not contemplate mediators like those in California
who are empowered to make recommendations to the court on the ultimate issue of child
custody.
One commentator suggests that standards imposed by professional organizations and
associations need to be enforced by licensing bodies if participants are to be effectively
protected. He emphasizes the importance of such enforcement mechanisms in cases where
the mediation is mandatory and the result is rubber-stamped by the courts. Paul Devine,
Mediator Qualifications:Are Ethical Standards Enough to Protect the Client?, 12 ST. Louis
U. PUB. L REv. 187, 188 (1993).
238. STAHL, supra note 27, at 153; GouLD, supra note 32, at 14.
239. SENATE JUDICARY Commrira REPoRT, 2124, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000).
240. Frances Harrison et al., California's Family Law FacilitatorProgram: A New
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lengthy meetings with the parties and fact-finding required to
support individualized determinations in custody cases, some other
(and more expensive) alternatives, such as children's counsel or
custody evaluators, would have to be employed for every case. It
was simply assumed that family court judges could not hear the
cases themselves, especially in light of the large percentage of
cases with pro se litigants who do not have attorneys to investigate
and develop the facts to present to the court. 24' Indeed, there was a
very real fear that without the involvement of psychologists,
mediators, and social workers, the family courts would collapse
under the load.
VI.

WHAT ROLE SHOULD MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS PLAY IN
CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS?

The reintroduction of legal presumptions into child custody law
raises new questions about the appropriate involvement of
psychologists, mediators, and social workers in child custody
decision-making. Correctly applying the law and protecting parties'
due process rights need to be balanced against assisting judges
with overwhelming caseloads.
One possibility for accommodating the involvement of
psychologists, mediators, and social workers in child custody
decision-making, without running afoul of legal standards, would be
to exempt cases involving legal presumptions from
recommendations by mental health professionals. However,
according to statistics collected in a California study by the
Statewide Office of Family Court Services, as a result, the majority
of custody cases seen in California Family Court Services would
become exempt. 24 For example, the statistical reports indicate that
over half of all cases mediating child custody and visitation in FCS
are subject to the legal presumption that it is not in the best
physical or
interests of a child to be placed in the sole or joint
23
legal custody of a perpetrator of domestic violence. 4
Paradigm for the Courts, 2 J.CENTER FOR FAm., CHILDREN & CTS. 61, 70 (2001); Jona
Goldschmidt, How Are Judges and Courts Coping with Pro Se Litigants?: Results From a
Survey of Judges and Court Managers 4, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law
& Society Association, St. Louis, Mo. (1997).
241. Recent data suggests that the number of California divorces brought by
self-represented litigants is nearing 7596. Harrison, supra 240, at 61.
242. MELTON, supra note 31, at 485.
243. UNIFORM STATISTICAL REPORTING SYSTEM, REPORT 6 -ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY: STATISCAL
at
http://
available
(Februaryl996)
STATEWIDE
STUDIES
FROM
Two
PROFILES
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courtadmin/aoc/familycourtservices/usrs/report061/rO6sum.htm. Another
study looking at couples disputing child custody issues in Portland, Oregon and Minneapolis,
Minnesota who were court-ordered to attend Family Court Services mediation or evaluation
found even higher percentages of domestic abuse, with 80% of the women and 72% of the
men reporting being abused. Lisa Newmark et al., Domestic Violence and Empowerment in
Custody and Visitation Cases, 33 FAm. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 30, 36 (1995).
The statute explaining the legal presumption states in part:
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Further, the statistics from the FCS study show that a parent's
desire to move was an issue in one-third of the cases mediated by
FCS personnel across the state, reaching fifty-percent in some
courts. 2" These custody cases implicate the California "move-away"
presumption, which provides that a custodial parent may relocate
with his or her children unless the other parent can show that such
245
a move would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
Other California presumptions regarding the paternity of children
born to married women 46 and joint custody when both parents
agree, 247 play a role in many cases.
Accordingly, precluding the participation of mental health
professionals in custody cases involving legal presumptions would
likely cause the return of the majority of California custody cases
to judges for fact-finding and decision. Because of practical
considerations this may not be a viable option.
A second possibility for avoiding legal problems that arise when
mental health professionals are involved in custody proceedings is
to have the professionals serve solely as fact-finders, leaving the
actual custody decision-making to judges. This accords with the
original, more limited rationale for using child custody investigators
in California: to "produce for the judges evidence which might not
otherwise be available" such as visits to a child's home. 248 With the
Presumption against persons perpetrating domestic violence.
(a) Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody of the child or
against the child or the child's siblings within the previous five years, there is a
rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a
child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best
interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011. This presumption may only be rebutted
by a preponderance of the evidence.
CAL FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2000).
244. RESEARCH UPDATE HIGHUGHTS FROM THE 1991 CALIFORNIA FAMILY CouRr SERvIcEs
SNAPSHOT STUDY (Sept. 1993).
245. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 473.
246. CAL FAM. CODE § 7540 provides: "[e]xcept as provided in Section 7541, the child of
a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed
to be a child of the marriage." CAL FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2000).
247. CAL FAM. CODE § 3080 provides:
There is a presumption affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best
interest of a minor child, subjection to Section 3011, where the parents have agreed to
joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining
the custody of the minor child.
CAL FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 2000) (emphasis added).
Contrary to frequent but erroneous claims otherwise, CAL FAM. CODE § 3040 explicitly
states that no general presumption exists favoring joint custody in the absence of parental
agreement. Section 3040 provides in part:
(b) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or agaist joint
legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the court and the
family the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of
the child.
CAL FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2000).
248. Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 432, 435 (1943).
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growing burden on family court dockets over the years, however,
the role of investigators expanded to include broader fact-finding
responsibilities. This expanded role encompassed gathering
information available to judges through legal channels, such as
sworn affidavits and live witness testimony.
Even in the absence of recommendations to the court, this
expanded fact-finding role raises legal concerns. Fact-finding by
mental health professionals in custody proceedings unavoidably
raises due process concerns. Unlike court proceedings, which are
generally conducted on the record, fact-finding by mental health
professionals is usually conducted behind closed doors and
off-the-record. Custody evaluations, for example, are sometimes
the persons being evaluated
considered so confidential that even
249
are not allowed to see the reports.
Although there may be legitimate psychological reasons for such
secrecy, the use of "secret" evidence against a party to a legal
proceeding offends traditional notions of due process. 250 Due
process requires "fundamental fairness,"251 including the opportunity
to be heard on important issues "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."252 In custody evaluations, parties may not be
afforded sufficient notice to reasonably confront allegations against
them or to introduce evidence on their own behalf when
allegations regarding their suitability as parents are made in
confidential reports to which they do not have access.
Even where evaluation reports are made available to the parties,
significant legal problems can occur in the fact-finding process.
One technique common among custody evaluators, for example, is
to solicit, consider, and report hearsay statements, which are not
made under oath, from people2 3 referred to in the professional
literature as "collateral sources." 5
In re Marriage of Barnes demonstrates the due process
problems inherent in this technique. 254 The custody evaluator in
Barnes revealed late in his evaluation process that he was actively
collecting hearsay testimony from witnesses whose names had
been provided by the father.2s5 The evaluator disregarded objections
249. In some jurisdictions, evaluation reports are considered property of the court and
are not given either to attorneys or their clients. At best, attorneys may be allowed to read
the evaluation but may not have a physical copy of the evaluation to use in preparing their
client's case. STAHL, supra note 27, at 137.
250. Id. at 139-40. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
251. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
252. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
253. GouLD, supra note 32, at 19; Stahl, supra note 27, at 53-54.
254. In re Marriage of Barnes, No. 372447 WSC (Cal. Super. Ct. 1997).
255. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of First Motion in Limine to
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to this procedure by the mother's attorney and rejected requests
that testimony be taken by way of sworn affidavits or conference
calls with the parties or counsel present. 5 6 As a result, neither the
mother nor her attorney was informed of the exact nature of the
allegations of the hearsay witnesses.
The mother's attorney advised her, as a matter of self-defense, to
submit a list of witnesses whom she wanted the evaluator to
contact. 257 The evaluator contacted some, but not all of mother's
witnesses. One of mother's witnesses who was contacted called the
mother afterwards, upset by the nature, content, and manner of the
evaluator's questions; according to this witness, the evaluator
referred to mother's move to a different part of town as "skulking
out of town," and specifically asked if the mother had ever made
"public" statements to the effect that she was angry with the
father.218 This witness reported feeling that the evaluator had
already drawn his conclusions about mother and was merely
seeking corroborating information from the witness.2 9
In his report, the evaluator portrayed the mother as an angry
woman. 26° In support of this portrayal, he quoted several hearsay
statements allegedly made by collateral source witnesses in his
report. However, none of the quoted statements regarding what the
mother had reportedly said or done was directly attributed to the
person who made the statements. It was later learned that some of
was included in
the collateral source witnesses whose testimony
261
the evaluator's report were not named at all.
The evaluator directed the attorneys to relay to their clients only
the final recommendations, and not to share the contents of the
report with them.262 However, the mother's attorney, believing this
would violate his ethical duty to his client, 263 showed the report to
the mother. When the mother reviewed the report, she did not
recognize the statements that had been attributed to her and
became concerned when the evaluator refused her the opportunity
to tell him that she had not made them. In an attempt to set the
record straight, the mother's counsel deposed four of the father's
hearsay witnesses. 264 These witnesses indicated that they had
expected complete confidentiality and were described by the
mother's counsel as "outraged at being asked to account for their
Exclude the Report of Dr. Yanon Volcani. at 7, In re Marriage of Barnes, No. D 372447 WSC
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum].
256. Id.
257. Id. at 8.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Memorandum, supra note 255, at 8.
261. Id. at 10.
262. Id. at 7.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 12.
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statements under oath." 265 During their depositions, the witnesses
could not recall with any degree of specificity what the evaluator
had asked them or what they had told him.266 In fact, none of their
deposition statements could be matched with any specific
statements quoted by the evaluator in his report.267 One witness
even confessed, in response to questioning by the mother's
attorney, that he had no personal knowledge of the events and
statements he had related to the evaluator, allegations that the
mother claimed were patently untrue. 268 Despite the irregularities
contained in this evaluation, the court denied
the mother's motion
269
in limine to strike the evaluation report.
Custody recommendations made by FCS personnel based on
mandatory "mediation" sessions also raise due process concerns. In
counties where FCS counselors make custody recommendations,
the mediation sessions in which they gather information from the
parties and draw their conclusions regarding custody are not
confidential proceedings. They are, however, conducted behind
closed doors and off-the-record. This system creates opportunities
for problems when mediators and parties differ about what
happened in the sessions.
For example, in one recent case, an FCS counselor submitted a
report to the court recommending that custody be awarded to a
father, who was alleged to have perpetrated violence against the
mother during the marriage. 270 The report cited certain statements
made by the mother in the "mediation" session as part of the basis
for the recommendation. Upon reading the report, the mother
claimed she had not made those statements. With no record of the
proceedings, the mother's challenge to the content and conduct of
these proceedings was reduced to the word of an apparently
disgruntled parent with a personal interest in the outcome, against
a court-appointed, presumptively neutral professional.
In another case, an FCS counselor reportedly began the
mediation session in a move-away case by clearly stating that he
265. Memorandum, supra note 255, at 13. The evaluator admitted that he had assured
the hearsay witnesses that their statements would not be attributed to them. Id. at 23. His
assurances were made a reality by his failure to keep notes of his interviews sufficient to
identify the statements that a particular witness had made. This failure appeared to be
particularly significant given that the inherent credibility of witnesses ranged from the
daughter's piano teacher (who talked about her son's "astral travel" experience in which his
spirit traveled out of his body) to the daughter's guidance counselor at school. Id. at 24, 34.
266. Id. at 13.
267. Id. at 14.
268. Id. at 15.
269. Motion in Limine to Strike Psychological Evaluation and Dismiss Pending
Modification Proceedings, In re Marriage of Barnes (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct 22, 1997)(No. D
372447 WSC).
Most unrepresented parents would have been quite unable to discover the types of
irregularities contained in this evaluation, let alone raise the issue to the court.
270. Interview with Kate Yavenditti, the mother's attorney.
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favored joint custody. He is reported to have said that he believed
that parents with children should not get divorced and, if they did,
they should live close to one another and share the parenting
responsibilities as much as possible.271 Not surprisingly, he
recommended that the custodial mother not be allowed to relocate
with her child. 2 7 However, these claimed statements, along with
others made by the mother in this case, are impossible to verify
2
because the sessions were held in private and not on the record. 7
In the same case, the mother reported that issues had been
raised in the mediation session that were not included in the
mediator's report and recommendation to the court. These issues
concerned a provision in the original custody order requiring the
father to have a separate bed for his young daughter when she
spent overnights in his care. 274 The mother claimed that this
provision was explicitly included in the original order because of
concerns about inappropriate behavior between the father and
daughter. According to mother, she told the mediator about this
provision and expressed her dismay and anxiety that father was
still sleeping in the same bed with the daughter four years later.
She reported that the mediator strongly confronted the father on
this issue and clearly emphasized that he was to arrange for
separate sleeping accommodations for daughter immediately.
However, there was no mention of this issue in the mediator's
recommendation to the court.2 7 5 Although mother's claim about the
provisions of the original order can be confirmed, there is no way
for her to prove what happened in the closed door, off-the-record
mediation session.
The mediator in this case apparently did not consider the
sleeping arrangement issue important enough to include in his
custody recommendation to the court. Might the judge have
considered the issue to be more significant? To the extent that the
mediator did not raise this issue in his report and this pro se
mother was not informed enough or assertive enough to raise the
issue independently, the judge had no way of knowing of the issue.
The notion that we can separate fact-finding from the
decision-making functions in child custody proceedings is illusory.
While those in the growing field of forensic psychology view their
specialty as part psychology and part law, many mental health
professionals feel that their task is a psychological one and that
271. Interview with the mother.
272. Recommendation on file with author.
273. For an example of mediator misconduct that served to invalidate the agreement
reached in court-ordered mediation see Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, No. 4D00-2013 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. August 22, 2001).
274. Order on file with author.
275. Interview with the mother, supra note 271.
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judges are responsible for application of the controlling law.276 Such
a clean division of responsibilities is, of course, impossible. Courts
cannot make fair and accurate determinations based on facts
collected from collateral sources without proper attention to
ensuring the reliability of the facts gathered. Furthermore, courts
where others take
cannot make independent decisions
off-the-record testimony and weigh the credibility of parties and
witnesses before reporting to the court. Even where judges
consciously try to remain independent of mental health
professionals' recommendations, they are necessarily exercising
their judgment on the basis of issues selected and facts developed
by those mental health professionals. Confidence in the ability of
the courts to retain their independent decision-making role and to
keep watch over the legal aspects of custody recommendations
may be misplaced.
One approach that might assuage this concern is to retain mental
health professionals' current level of involvement in child custody
decision-making, but address the legal concerns directly. This
would require in-depth legal training for mental health professionals
who do fact-find and make custody recommendations. While it
might be possible for law schools to develop special one-year
programs for mental health professionals serving the court system,
more than a few courses summarizing relevant laws would be
needed. Advisory councils consisting of members of the judiciary
and the mental health professions who are familiar with child
custody practice should develop the content of such programs.
Special exams would have to be developed to certify the legal
knowledge of the participating mental health professionals who
could then serve quasi-legal functions in the child custody
proceedings. However, while this might ensure that such "hybrid
professionals" had the requisite legal knowledge to conduct reliable
fact-finding and correctly apply the facts and law, it leaves
professional ethics in
unresolved questions about conflicting
2
situations involving such dual roles. 7
Procedural safeguards also have to be consciously instituted.
Fact-finding and decision-making procedures must be structured to
provide accountability for due process purposes. For example, FCS
sessions from which recommendations may emerge could be
recorded. Additionally, custody evaluators could be required to
have sworn affidavits from all collateral sources whose testimony is
used in their reports. Other procedural protections would need to
be put into place to address other areas of concern.
A very different option for resolving the legal concerns about the
involvement of psychologists, mediators, and social workers in the
276.
277.

GouLD, supra note 32, at 13.
MELTON, supra note 31, at 486.
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custody decision-making process is to return to a legal standard for
custody determinations. A true legal standard could be applied
without employing the wide-ranging, unguided, psychological,
predictive approach under the current best interests approach. A
genuine legal standard, to which facts could be directly applied,
would obviate the need for much of the current involvement of
psychologists, mediators, and social workers. The American Law
Institute (ALI) in their new "Principles of Family Dissolution" has
recommended such a presumptive rule of decision for child
custody cases.2 78
The ALT Principles assume that parental agreement on custody
issues is beneficial to children and clear preference is given to such
agreements.2 7 9 In cases where parents cannot agree, the main rule
for allocating physical custody is to approximate the share of
care-taking each parent performed for the child before the parents
separated.m This continues the overall emphasis on parental
agreement pursuant to the belief that "when parents do not agree,
past divisions of responsibility may be the most reliable proxy for
the shares of responsibility they would agree upon if they were
focused on their child."2s ' With regard to legal custody, joint
allocation of decision-making responsibility is presumed to be in
the child's best interest so long as each parent has been reasonably
involved in parenting functions.m
This approximation approach to allocating custodial
responsibility has the advantage of generating more predictable
results than the current best interests approach. Greater
predictability, in turn, is believed to reduce both litigation and
strategic behavior by parties. 283 The approximation approach also
avoids having to make predictions about the future and thus
reduces the expense and uncertainty associated with expert
2
witnesses and psychological evaluations. M
The ALI Principles
explicitly recommend that mediators not make recommendations to
2
the court. 85
CONCLUSION

Family courts are overwhelmed with cases and with pro se
278. PRINCIPL , supra note 1.
279. If parents agree on how to share responsibility for their child, Chapter 2 requires
that their agreement be accepted unless the court specifically finds that the agreement was
either not knowing or voluntary, or that the agreed upon arrangement would be harmful to
the child. Id. at 10.
280. Id. at 10, 108-10.
281. Id. at 11.
282. Id. at 186.
283. Id. at 1.
284. PRINcIPLES, supra note 1, at 11.
285. Id. at 92.
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litigants.2 The involvement of mental health professionals to assist
the courts is creating legal problems. Either strengthening the legal
aspects of mental health professionals' involvement or moving to a
rule of decision that significantly reduces the need for their
involvement represents a distinct change in direction for the family
court system. The response to the ALI Principles will constitute an
important opportunity to initiate discussion and dialogue in the
legal and professional communities on this issue.

286.

Harrison, supra note 240, at 61, 70.

